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We examine the daily exchange rate dynamics in selected EU new member states 
(Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) using GARCH and TARCH 
models between 1999 and 2004. We show that these countries tried to reduce 
volatility of the spot exchange rate despite their official policy of free floating and 
inflation targeting. However, we find that the low credibility of exchange rate 
policy implied higher volatility of exchange rates when it substantially deviated 
from the implicit target rates for all countries. Finally, we find significant 
asymmetric effects of the volatility of exchange rates in all new member states.  
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1.  Introduction 
All new member states (NMS) of the EU
1 face a trade off between exchange rate stability and 
flexibility. The recent literature on optimum currency area (OCA) criteria in the NMS 
surveyed by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006) shows that these countries increasingly constitute 
an optimum currency area with the EMU. Similarly, Horváth (2006) finds that the NMS fulfill 
OCA criteria at approximately the same level as the euro area countries before they adopted 
euro suggesting that the benefits of exchange rate stability may prevail.  
By contrast, the developments especially in Central Europe
2 showed a process of 
increasing exchange rate flexibility during the previous decade (see Markievicz, 2006, and 
Frömmel and Schobert, 2006), which was reversed only recently by the first accessions to the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism II and the starting process of euro adoption in the NMS of the EU 
(Slovenia in January 2007).
3 In the specific conditions of these countries, relatively flexible 
exchange rate regimes have appeared to be appropriate to deal with the high capital flows, 
                                                           
1 Reflecting that also Romania and Bulgaria will join the EU in January 2007, we refer to all 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe analyzed here as to NMS.  
2 On the other hand, several smaller transition economies in South East Europe and in the 
Baltics have adopted currency boards or comparably fixed exchange rate regimes. This development 
confirms Eichengreen’s (1994) bipolar hypothesis that small and open economies have to decide 
between the extreme points of exchange rate flexibility.  
3 Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia joined the ERM II in 2004, while Cyprus, Malta, Latvia and 
Slovakia followed in 2005. Furthermore, Slovenia already fulfilled the Maastricht criteria meaning 
that it will be able to introduce the euro by January 2007.  
1 productivity improvements and the increasing appreciation of exchange rates also in the 
nominal terms (see Égert and Lommatzsch, 2004). At the same time, the exchange rate peg 
was replaced by monetary policies putting more emphasis on inflation stabilization. Actually, 
nearly all countries of our sample have adopted different types of inflation targeting.
4 Still, 
several NMS have used interventions at the foreign exchange market (see Égert and Komárek, 
2006 or Geršl and Holub, 2006). On the one hand, these actions were largely motivated by 
inflation and competitiveness pressures, which depend in small and open economies heavily 
on exchange rates. On the other hand, this development corresponds also to the fear of 
floating phenomenon analyzed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002).  
These arguments mean that some NMS are likely to pursue a de facto exchange rate 
policy of implicit target zones around time-varying target exchange rates, which is similar to 
the proposal of target zone around a fundamental equilibrium exchange rate proposed by 
Williamson (1985), Edison et al. (1987), and Chmelarova and Schnabl (2006). Similarly like 
in Krugman’s (1991) exchange rate target zone model, the volatility of exchange rate at the 
borders of target zones should be smaller than in the area close to the central parity if the 
regime is fully credible. In the opposite case, we should observe that exchange rate volatility 
increases with the distance from the target exchange rates. The opposite case is especially 
appealing for us, as we model the countries that did not adopt official target zone, but rather 
intervened from time to time on the foreign exchange market. 
 Furthermore, expectations may be in principle formed differently in the appreciation and 
depreciation parts of the target zones (either de jure or de facto), which may cause systematic 
asymmetric effects. Finally, countries following pure inflation targeting policy are likely to 
show no significant differences in exchange rate volatility with respect to the target exchange 
rates. The estimation of this pattern of exchange rate behavior necessitates the approximation 
of the target exchange rates and models of exchange rate volatility by generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models. Potential asymmetry in 
exchange rate volatility is addressed by threshold autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (TARCH) models. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the exchange 
rate target zones. Section 3 presents data and Section 4 estimates GARCH models. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes.  
                                                           
4 Czech Republic and Poland adopted inflation targeting in 1998, Romania and Slovakia 
followed after a period of informal inflation targeting in 2005.  
2 2.  Related Literature  
A fixed exchange rate regime with a non-zero fluctuation band is generally referred to as a 
target zone (see for example Ghosh et al., 2003). The motivation for maintaining a target zone 
exchange rate regime is typically that some flexibility in exchange rate fluctuations is 
allowed, while the bands in principle assure an elimination of the eventually excessive 
fluctuations common under free float exchange rate regime. For a comprehensive survey of 
this literature, we refer a reader to Kempa and Nelles (1999), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998), and 
Sarno and Taylor (2002). 
Krugman (1991) provides a seminal contribution to an analysis of exchange rate dynamics 
under target zones. The early naive approach to exchange rate modeling in the target zone 
assumed that exchange rate behaves as the free float inside the band and as the fixed exchange 
rate regime at the edge of the band. In consequence, fluctuation band has no influence on 
exchange rate behavior inside the band. However, Krugman (1991) stresses the role of 
exchange rate expectations and argues that existence of credible fluctuation band influences 
the exchange rate behavior not only at the edge of the band, but also inside the band. 
Consequently, when exchange rate is close to the edge of the band, the foreign exchange 
market participants expect that central bank will intervene in order to keep the exchange rate 
inside the band. As a result, the expected change of exchange rate is non-zero, but either 
positive or negative depending whether the exchange rate reaches weaker or stronger side of 
the fluctuation band. Consequently, exchange rate is mean-reverting (this is typically labeled 
as honeymoon effect in target zone literature). Besides, the exchange rate becomes completely 
insensitive to fundamentals at the edges of the band (which is referred to as smooth pasting).  
There have been several papers examining the Krugman model empirically. Engle and 
Gau (1997) examine whether the position of spot exchange rate within the band is associated 
to its volatility using the data from several EU countries participating in the European 
Monetary System in 1986-1993. They find rather mixed support for the Krugman model, 
namely only in few countries the negative relationship between the deviation of the exchange 
rate from its central parity and the exchange rate volatility is detected. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 
(2005a) study exchange rate dynamics in a majority of EU members over different sample 
periods. Primarily, they test for the so-called effective band within the officially announced 
band. The motivation is that central banks typically do not wait until the exchange rate hits the 
official band, but rather start intervening already within the band. Chmelarova and Schnabl 
3 discuss intervention pattern based on Krugram’s model in Croatia as compared to developed 
countries.  
Exchange rate volatility in selected NMS is also analyzed by Kočenda and Valachy 
(2006). They find that exchange rate volatility generally increased with the introduction of 
more flexible exchange rate arrangements and the level of interest rates differential tends to 
decrease exchange rate volatility, while the volatility of interest rates differential increase it.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Czech  Republic  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
Mean 33.63  4.11  42.49  281.0 
Median 33.31  4.09  42.47  278.9 
Maximum 38.68  4.90  46.98  414.3 
Minimum 28.95  3.35  39.71  128.7 
Standard deviation  2.28  0.35  1.41  87.95 
Skewness  0.22  0.08 0.12 0.04 
Kurtosis  1.86  2.34 2.62 1.63 
Jarque-Bera  test  91.26  28.30 12.36 115.3 
  [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Observations  1466  1466 1466 1466 
Notes:  p-values are reported in the brackets.  
 
3.  Data 
In this section, we present the data and some descriptive statistics. At our disposal, we have 
the daily data on exchange rate of local currency vis-à-vis euro for the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Romania between January 1999, and March 2005. In total, this makes 
about 1500 observations. The implicit target exchange rate is approximated by 240
th moving 
average mode (that is, the average of ±120 trading days or approximately one year), 
MA(240).
5 The computation of moving average restricts our estimation period to January 
1999 until August 2004. Alternatively, we use the equilibrium values of exchange rates 
estimated within the monetary model by Crespo-Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and MacDonald (2005)
6 
and extrapolate them to daily values. 
                                                           
5 Moving average, as the approximation of equilibrium exchange rate, is also adopted by e.g. Ito 
and Yabu (2006) and Chmelarova and Schnabl (2006). 
6 For the sake of space, we do not present the results based on these data, but they are available 
on a request.  
4 Figure 1 presents the exchange rate developments for our sample countries. Generally, 
nominal exchange rate appreciation is visible for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. On the 
other hand, Polish exchange rate does not seem to exhibit any pattern during the analyzed 
period. Finally, the Romanian lei depreciates substantially over the sample period, which 
corresponds to the de facto crawling peg applied by the Bank of Romania. Table 1 provides 
some basic descriptive statistics. Using the coefficient of variation, Slovak currency is the 
least volatile, followed by Czech crown and Polish zloty. On the other hand, Romanian 
currency exhibits a much larger volatility, which reflects also the exchange rate depreciation 
during the analyzed period.  
 
Figure 1: Exchange Rates vis-à-vis Euro, 1999-2004 



















































5 4.  Results 
4.1.  GARCH Models 
The GARCH models are generally applied for the estimations of the conditional volatility 
of high-frequency (daily) exchange rate changes (see Baillie and Bollerslev, 1989). Following 
Engle and Gau (1997), we test one of the implications of Krugman (1991) model of target 
zones. Krugman shows that the conditional volatility of exchange rate decreases as exchange 
rate approaches the edge of the target band. As a result, we estimate whether the deviation of 
the exchange rate from its target rate decreases the conditional volatility. Our baseline 
specification is a GARCH(1,1) model,  
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where s
D and s
F denote the spot daily exchange rate of currency to euro and the time varying 
target rate (moving average of ±120 trading days) as defined in the previous section, 
respectively. We do not include any explanatory variables except for constant to equation (1), 
because daily exchange rates are expected to be influenced largely by news and other random 
events (see Bask and Fidrmuc, 2006, for the discussion of high-frequency exchange rate 
movements in the NMS). The constant term in equation (1), μ, shows the average rate of 
appreciation or depreciation. The error term, ξ, of the mean equation (1) is assumed to have a 
time varying conditional variance, σ
2, specified by equation (2).  
The conditional variance equation includes in addition to the ARCH term, ξt-1, and the 
GARCH term, σ
2
t-1, also the distance between the spot and the target exchange rates, which is 
the major variable of our interest. Krugman’s (1991) model implies that δ is negative, i.e. the 
conditional volatility decreases as exchange rate moves towards the edge of the band, as long 
as the announced or implicit target zones are fully credible. The opposite is true for the target 
zones subject to speculative attacks and low credibility. Finally, we expect no relationship 
between the conditional variance and the target exchange rates if no implicit target zones are 
specified.  
Our dataset contains daily exchange rates of Czech, Polish, Romanian, and Slovak 
currencies to euro between January 1999 and March 2005 (note that the computation of 
moving average restricts our estimation period to August 2004, as mentioned above). On the 
one hand, the starting point of our analysis is determined by the creation of the euro. Thus, we 
avoid observations characterized by possibly non-standard volatility due to the change-over in 
the euro area countries. On the other hand, all NMS introduced free floating policies 
6 supported by a kind of inflation targeting regime in this period. These countries also did not 
experience any severe currency crisis during the analyzed time. As Hungary and Slovenia 
experienced policy changes related to the introduction of the floating exchange rates in the 
former case and the participation in the ERM II in the latter one, we exclude these countries 
from our analysis. Similarly, we had to exclude all countries with currency boards (Bulgaria 
and the Baltic States).  
Table 3 reports the estimations of (1) and (2) for the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Romania between January 1, 1999, and October 1, 2004.
7 The results provide several 
interesting insights. First, we can see that the NMS do not show any significant trend of 
nominal appreciation or depreciation. In turn, the Romanian currency depreciated 
significantly during the period, which corresponds to the de facto crawling peg applied by the 
Bank of Romania (see Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2005c). Second, we can see that the 
conditional volatility significantly depends on actual lagged squared error term and lagged 
conditional variance of the error term. Furthermore, the sum of the ARCH and GARCH term 
is relatively high, which indicates that the volatility of the shocks in all countries is quite 
persistent. Nevertheless, the sum of both coefficients is significantly lower than unity in all 
countries except for Romania.  
Finally, we find that the deviation of the spot exchange rate from its target level is 
positively significant for all the countries. This implies that as the target bands were implicit, 
they suffered generally under their low credibility. Similarly to e.g. Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) 
our results suggest that exchange rates do not act as shock absorbers. In turn, exchange rates 
may be a source of macroeconomic destabilization if they approach ranges of the implicit 
target zones. Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that all coefficients are very small, 
although Poland and the Czech Republic shows the highest impact (in absolute value) of 
exchange rate deviations from the exchange rate target. In case of Slovakia, we have to 
include MA(1) in the mean equation to assure white noise in the residuals.  
Figure 2 presents the conditional variance for all countries in our sample. Poland and 
Romania show higher conditional variance in selected periods (2001 for Poland and 1999 for 
Romania) than the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Nevertheless, we can see frequent changes 
of the conditional variance in all NMS.  
 
                                                           
7  The computation of the moving average for daily exchange rate as a proxy for the target rate 
restricts slightly the available estimation period)  
7 Table 2: Estimates of the Effect of the Spot Position to the Target Value on Conditional Volatility 
(GARCH Models)  
Country Czech  Republic  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
μ  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001
***























  (3.759) (6.066) (5.903) (2.153) 




  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.480] 
Period    1999:I-2004:VIII 1999:I-2004:VIII 1999:I-2004:VIII 1999:I-2004:VIII 
L-B(10), RES  6.56   10.00  11.52  8.58 
  [0.77] [0.44] [0.24] [0.57] 
L-B(10), SQRES  4.31 7.18 2.99 7.21 
L-B(10), SQRES  [0.93] [0.71] [0.97] [0.71] 
N  1469 1469 1469 1469 
Notes: We report z-statistics in parenthesis and p-values of the Wald test that γ2 + γ3 = 1 and the Ljung-Box Q-
statistics of the 10
th lag for standard and squared residuals in brackets. ***, **, and * - denotes significance at 1 




8 Figure 2: Conditional  Standard Deviation (GARCH Models) 
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4.2.  TARCH Models 
We can often see that the volatility of financial variables is different along positive and 
negative trends (see Engle and Ng, 1993). The downwards movements of share prices are 
usually associated with higher volatility of financial data. In this regard, Zakoian (1990) and 
Glosten et al. (1993) proposed the threshold ARCH models to analyze asymmetric volatility.  
Central banks may be also likely to fight against the currency depreciation more 
intensively than against currency appreciation. One reason for this asymmetry can be the fact 
that countries in this region typically experience real exchange rate appreciation due to the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect (Égert and Lommatzsch, 2004). Additionally, the ERM II has even 
some inherited certain asymmetric components as countries are allowed to appreciate the 
central parity, but its depreciation causes a violation of the exchange rate criterion (see de 
Grauwe and Schnabel, 2005). This pattern of behavior may play an important role already 
during the preparation for the later membership in the ERM II. Thus, the exchange rate target 
zones may be more credible if exchange rate is approaching the depreciation limit (that is, the 
upper bound according to our definition of exchange rates) of the target band. In turn, a 
9 central bank may define its objective in relation to the national competitiveness. Several 
transition countries have been often concerned by the excessive exchange rate appreciation 
and some even aimed to stabilize its real exchange rate (see Coricelli et al., 2006). This may 
be especially important for the NMS with the strong appreciation trends due to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, deregulation of prices and tradable prices appreciation. Finally, market 
participants may behave differently if exchange rate is overvalued or undervalued. Actually, 
Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2005a) find important asymmetric volatility effects both in EU15 
countries as well as in the NMS.  
Correspondingly, we extend the standard TARCH model as we take into account also the 
position of the spot exchange rate in relation to its target value. Our estimation specification is 
as follows,  
  , (3)  jt j
D




















2 , (4) 
where D
arch is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the residual from the mean equation, ξ, is 
negative and zero otherwise. Similarly, D
s is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spot exchange 
rate is lower than the target value, that is, if the exchange rate is in the appreciation part of the 
target zone.  
Although the asymmetric ARCH terms, γ4, is significant only in Poland, we can see that 
that the asymmetric effects of exchange rate misalignments are significant also in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia (see Table 3).
8 Negative exchange rate deviations (that is, exchange 
rate appreciation) are positive and significant both in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. We 
find a positive sign also for Poland. This indicates that the target zones are less credible in the 
appreciation part in these countries.
9 By contrast, we can see that the persistence of exchange 
rate shocks is lower during the appreciation periods in Poland and in Slovakia, while it is 
generally low in the Czech Republic than otherwise. Only in Romania we can find as before 
that the exchange rate volatility is persistent in both parts of the implicit target zones. In 
Poland, the persistence of exchange rate shocks is not significantly different from unity in the 
depreciation periods, but the opposite is true for the appreciation times.  
                                                           
8 Correspondingly, the development pattern of exchange rate volatility is similar to that 
presented in Figure 2. Detailed results are available upon request from authors.  
9 Note that, by definition, the opposite is true for the depreciation side of the target zone.  
10  
Table 3: Asymmetric Estimates of the Effect of Spot Position to Target Value on Conditional 
Volatility (TARCH Models) 
Country Czech  Republic  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
μ 0.000
* 0.000 0.000  0.001
***

















  (23.507) (52.000) (42.007)  (124.638) 
γ4 0.027 -0.099
*** -0.021 -0.001 










  (4.517) (1.144) (3.588) (-1.219) 
γ2 + γ3 = 1  0.854
*** 0.986 0.930
*** 0.999 
  [0.000] [0.295] [0.000] [0.927] 




  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.850] 
Period    1999:I-2004:VIII 1999:I-2004:VIII 1999:I-2004:VIII 1999:I-2004:VIII 
L-B(10), RES  6.163  10.852  11.778  8.883 
  [0.801] [0.369] [0.226] [0.543] 
L-B(10), SQRES    5.168  5.686  3.008  7.151 
  [0.880] [0.841] [0.964] [0.711] 
N  1468 1468 1468 1468 
Notes: We report z-stats in parenthesis and p-values of the Wald test that γ2 + γ3 = 1 and γ2 + γ3 + γ4 = 1, as well 
as the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the 10
th lag for standard and squared residuals in brackets. ***, **, and * 
denotes significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. For clarity of the discussion in the text, 
coefficients δ are multiplied by 10
5.  
11 Figure 3: Conditional Variance and the Deviation of Spot Exchange Rate from the 
Target Rate  










































Figure 3 documents the asymmetrical relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
the relative level of exchange rates as compared to the targets based on the results reported in 
Table 3. We can see that the conditional variance increases as the actual exchange rate 
deviates from its implicit target rate. Furthermore, there are influential observations with 
exchange rate appreciation and extreme values of exchange rate volatility also in the Czech 
Republic. By contrast, observations with extreme exchange rate volatility are concentrated in 
the depreciation part of the target zones in Romania (especially observations from 1999, as 
12 can be seen also in Figure 2) and in Slovakia. Poland shows the highest volatility of exchange 
rates around the implicit target values in 2001 (see also Figure 2).  
 
5.  Conclusions 
We analyze high frequency exchange rate dynamics in selected NMS. Our sample consists of 
four inflation targeting countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Romania) that 
maintain flexible exchange rate policies between 1999 and 2004.  
Following the target zone model by Krugman (1991), we examine the exchange rate 
volatility in connection to the estimated target exchange rate. We estimate GARCH models of 
daily exchange rate volatility. We find that the volatility is quite persistent in all NMS. In 
addition, the exchange rate is more volatile the further it is from its implicit target rate in all 
analyzed countries. This implies that there are implicit exchange rate target zones in these 
countries, however, which suffer under insufficient credibility.  
Finally, our TARCH results point to systematic asymmetries in the exchange rate 
volatility in the EU NMS. Especially during the periods of exchange rate appreciation, the 
volatility of exchange rate is pronounced in all NMS except for Romania. In summary, our 
results indicate that exchange rates are ineffective tools for stabilization policies in NMS. 
Policy measures aiming at maintaining competitiveness result mainly in increased volatility of 
exchange rates, which may introduce further uncertainties to exporters in these countries.  
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